The case for Jordan Walsh (plus a Missouri preview)

The case for Jordan Walsh (plus a Missouri preview)

Adam Ford

This post is now quite lengthy, and rather than preview a Mizzou team that we already looked at a couple weeks ago, we’re going to focus again on our claim surrounding Jordan Walsh’s impact on Arkansas’ offense.

Notes on how we use advanced stats at Fayette Villains

On Sunday, we posted our Box Score Breakdown from the Vanderbilt game, making the (admittedly bold) claim that Jordan Walsh, who has been struggling to shoot and has seen his minutes decline, is actually Arkansas’ offensive MVP this season. That’s what the numbers tell us – we included a lot of numbers in that post and are about to provide even more in this one – but it’s also what the eye test tells us. There’s a valid reason for why Walsh provides so much value: his off-ball movement helps Arkansas space the floor and provide lanes for the Hogs’ tall guards to get to the rim. This should not be surprising: that’s what Arkansas wants to do on offense anyway. Trevon Brazile was supposed to also help with that (more on defense, but he can play the perimeter on offense too), but since he’s out, Walsh is the only remaining option to give the Hogs that level of versatility without resorting to a very small lineup. Attempts to move away from him by playing two true bigs (and clogging the lane) don’t really work.

Our claim regarding Walsh eventually reached Arkansas Rivals basketball recruiting analyst Jackson Collier, who tweets under the name JC Hoops. Here was his response:

If you have Twitter, feel free to read the entire back-and-forth that followed. It was rather contentious and also kind of dumb: despite plenty of pompous nonsense about JC’s “knowledge of the game of basketball” and “completely ignor[ing] the eye test”, JC never actually bothers to tell us what he thinks “the eye test” actually shows. Our central claim – that Walsh is easily the best option at the 4, and key to Arkansas’ entire offensive scheme, because he spaces the floor and facilitates offensive movement in a way that no other currently-healthy Hog forward does – remains completely unchallenged. As we walk through the data below, keep that claim in mind.

Here are a few needed clarifications in light of our discussion on Twitter.

Most valuable is not the same thing as most productive (or best)

We chose our words very carefully here. You may have a best friend, and an investor may have a most valuable asset, but the difference is that the investor’s asset is objectively quantifiable. Nowhere did we claim that Walsh is Arkansas’ best offensive player, because he is rather obviously not. Ricky Council IV is probably Arkansas’ most productive offensive player, but I don’t see anyone claiming he’s the best over Anthony Black.

As we’ve mentioned, the case for Walsh as Offensive MVP is based on ORAPM, which is a ridge regression that measures team performance while a player is on the floor with a bias factor (known as lambda) that aims to remove collinearity. No box score statistics are used because the goal of the game is to outscore the opponent, not stuff the stat sheet. The output of the RAPM function tells us how good a player’s team is while he’s on the floor, regardless of who he’s sharing the floor with. Correlation is obviously not causation, but over a large enough sample size, the implication becomes unavoidable.

But wait! Maybe you’re thinking (like JC was): That math sounds a bit fishy (or “manipulated“, or “tilted“) to me. I don’t like any advanced stats that aren’t extremely intuitive. Okay, fine: we’ll make the case for Walsh without citing RAPM again. Everything here will be very basic stats.

The case for Walsh

Walsh isn’t Arkansas’ most valuable offensive player because he’s that truly talented on offense. Again, we were careful not to make that claim. He’s got a long way to go to develop offensively. But just as an investor’s most valuable asset is only so relative to his total portfolio, so too is Walsh relative to Arkansas’ roster. Walsh simply being on the floor allows Arkansas to get better spacing. Walsh would have had a lot of help in that department from Trevon Brazile, who could play the 4 or 5 on the perimeter. But Brazile is out, so Walsh is the only forward who can play on the perimeter like that without sacrificing height in the Arkansas lineup. When Arkansas takes Walsh out, they cannot put Brazile in, so whoever enters the game ends up clogging up the lane and reducing Arkansas’ ability to get their guards going downhill to the basket.

When we talk about “objectively quantifiable”, this is what we mean:

This is Arkansas’ offense in SEC play only based on who is on the floor. Arkansas has scored 343 points across 352 possessions in SEC play (97.4 OFF EFF). Arkansas’ offense is at its best when Walsh is on the floor (104.2 OFF EFF) and there’s a 17 BPS decline (about 12 points per full game) when he hits the bench.

I had a lot of this in my replies yesterday:

Yes! And the offense is almost as bad when Walsh comes off the floor! If that doesn’t pass your eye test, check your eyes!

But wait! You may be thinking: but how exactly does Walsh do this without scoring? This could just be a coincidence, or something based on a matchup. Do Arkansas’ other offensive players just play better when he’s out there?

Let’s chart how Arkansas’ main three guards perform while Walsh is on the floor with them versus when he is off the floor. First, a few definitions:

  • Rim USG. That’s the percentage of field goal attempts that are listed in the official play-by-play data as dunks, layups, or tip-ins. Basically, share of shots at the rim.
  • TS%. True Shooting is the scoring efficiency of a player’s shots. It’s calculated as the points per scoring chance, divided by two (to reflect a basic 2-point shot being worth 2 points).
  • EPR. Effective Possession Ratio is the rate at which a player (or team) turns possessions into scoring chances. It is the scoring chances created per 100 possessions. Offensive rebounds make it go up, and turnovers make it go down.
  • OFF EFF. That’s offensive efficiency, or the number of points scored per 100 possessions.

A few observations from this:

  • All three of Arkansas’ guards are significantly worse at getting to the rim, and the team as a whole is slightly worse. This is yet another confirmation of our hypothesis: Walsh’s presence on the floor makes it easier for Arkansas’ guards to get to the rim. Council in particular sees his rim usage cut in half when Walsh exits the game.
  • Lower rim usage = fewer offensive rebounds. One of Arkansas’ advantages is its tall guards. If you get them around the rim, they can win battles for offensive boards against their shorter defenders. But if you can’t get them to the rim, you lose the entire advantage that having tall guards provides! Arkansas’ team EPR dips a bit (103.7 to 92.6) when Walsh leaves the floor. But the bigger drop is the personal EPRs of all three main guards, particularly Council. And this makes perfect sense: when Arkansas isn’t spacing the floor well, the guards are not in position for offensive rebounds.

Examples of Walsh’s spacing creating a chance for a tall guard to snag an offensive board are abundant. Here’s a quick one I found, where Walsh occupies LSU’s 6’10 forward Jalen Reed by moving out to the corner, creating a lane for Black to clean up a miss:

Take Walsh out and put it another big, and that offensive rebound probably doesn’t happen.

But wait! You may thinking: Maybe it’s just a matchup thing. Maybe Walsh played a ton of minutes in one or two games and that’s skewing the total. Is Walsh’s impact consistent within the same game, and not just in comparisons of different games? Let’s find out!

One more definition for this final chart.

  • RimMakes+OREB%. Percentage of field goal attempts that end with either a made shot at the rim or an offensive rebound, two results that Arkansas wants.

So when Walsh is on the floor, a majority of Arkansas’ field goal attempts either end in a made shot at the rim or an offensive rebound. And when Walsh is off the floor, a majority do not. And that’s held true in every single SEC game.

At this point, if the “eye test” doesn’t tell you Walsh helps Arkansas’ offense… then the problem is your eyes.

Kamani Johnson probably deserves more minutes, but his play will always be situational

I feel like our discussion was shifted by an unintentional motte-and-bailey fallacy, as the initial claim that created the firestorm was about Walsh’s role in the offense, but most of the Twitter conversation revolved around a secondary claim made in the Box Score Breakdown about Kamani Johnson having the highest RAPM of all potential 5s for the Hogs. The Walsh claim I am happy to boldly defend again and again, but the Kamani claim was more contextual: the boldest I came to saying that Kamani should play more minutes was writing, “Maybe I would consider using this lineup more often?” regarding a lineup with Kamani starting. That was largely intended as a lead-in to this post, a preview of the Missouri game. This is one of the few games left on the schedule where Arkansas can actually afford to play a 6’7 center.

And if you can afford to play a 6’7 center against a team likely to play zone, Kamani is a great option. He leads the team in offensive rebound rate (17%, that’s the percentage of missed shots while he’s on the floor where he gets the offensive rebound) and the aforementioned free throw usage rate. That skillset helps him destroy a zone or pack line – which is exactly what he did in the first meeting.

Obviously, he has some limiting factors: namely, his size means he cannot play center opposite Alabama’s Charles Bediako or a whole host of other SEC big men. But Arkansas knows this and doesn’t play him in those situations anyway. That’s one of the reasons his numbers look good. But when the matchup is favorable, he’s a good option. Additionally, his aggression (he leads the team in steal rate) also causes him to rack up fouls. He’ll never be able to average 30+ minutes per game because of foul trouble. He fouled out in nine minutes against Vanderbilt, although that’s a bit of an outlier.

Controversial take: getting fouled is good

One of the silliest (and most easily disprovable) claims related to Kamani was this: that Kamani Johnson should not get more minutes because he’s only shooting 53% from the line. I mean, yeah, it would be ideal if he could shoot a much higher percentage, but it’s pretty widely known by anyone who can do math that just getting to the line is one of the most efficient ways you can score. You don’t even have to be that good at making free throws to make it worth it! As we’ve discussed many times on this site (and as JC was responding to), Kamani leads the Hogs in free throw usage, which is the percentage of his scoring chances inside the arc that end up with him at the line. Across the NBA and college, players average about 0.44 free throw trips per free throw attempt (it’s not 0.50 because of and-ones, which Kamani gets a few of), so 53% FT% / 0.44 Trips/FTA = 1.20 points per trip, or 60% True Shooting. The nation’s #1 True Shooting team, Colgate, is at exactly 60% for the season. A 60% TS% is the equivalent of shooting 60% inside the arc or 40% from beyond it.

So yeah, it turns out: getting fouled is good! It’s a very efficient way to score even if you’re not that good at actually converting the free throws! And even though he misses a lot, Kamani still (easily) leads the team in free throws made per 100 player possessions, because of his high rate of just getting to the line:

Box score stats per 40 minutes are a poor way to evaluate anything

JC rejected my RAPM data is “manipulated” and instead referred to box score stats per 40 minutes as “standard/normal (non-manipulated) analytics“. I’m not even going to deal with that, other than just repost that time in 2019 that Whole Hog Sports mentioned an “advanced metric” in a headline that turned out to be “third down conversions”. Very advanced!

Anyway, one of the claims in this case was that Kamani’s “total rebounds per 40 minutes” was the worst of all Arkansas forwards. This does appear to be true! I don’t use per 40 minutes numbers, but Kamani’s 15% total rebound rate (he grabs 15% of all available rebounds while he’s on the floor) is lower than Jalen Graham and the Mitchell twins. It’s higher than Walsh and higher than Brazile for the season, but it’s quite a bit lower than the other three guys.

But using “total rebounds per 40” to tell you anything presents a big issue. It reminds of my first video game: NCAA March Madness 2004 for PlayStation 2. I liked to build custom teams or completely edit the rosters of existing teams. One time, I edited every player on a team to create a team that had A+ defense and D offense, with every player having a 99 in Defensive Rebounding. I had that team play with very slow pace and simulated an entire season, then looked at the team stats. My team led the nation in defensive rebounding (obviously), but there was a problem: they had significantly more defensive rebounds than their opponents had missed shots, which is not possible. The game was clearly just making up numbers based on the skills I had given the players.

That’s not how it works in actual basketball. You can’t just create rebounds out of thin air: there has to be a chance to get a rebound. A missed shot. The Hogs found this out when they tried to start their two best defensive rebounders together – the Mitchell twins – against Vanderbilt. In theory, putting two guys with defensive rebound rates above 24% would lock down the defensive boards, right? Not exactly, Vanderbilt killed the Hogs on the offensive glass and Makhel Mitchell – who came in leading the team in defensive rebound rate – somehow managed just two boards in 18 minutes. Putting those two guys on the floor together simply caused them to split the available chances, not create more, and Arkansas’ defense got shredded so there were fewer defensive boards available to start with.

So the issue with Kamani’s rebounding is not how many boards he personally gets: it’s how well does the team rebound when Kamani is in the game?

The eye test told me that Kamani does a great job of boxing out, so even if he doesn’t personally get the rebound, Arkansas as a team probably rebounds just fine when he’s in the game. Turns out, I’m right:

Oops! Turns out “total rebounds per 40 minutes” is every bit as useless of a stat as it appears to be: Arkansas has been better at clearing defensive boards in SEC play when Kamani is out there.

A very quick glance at game clips reveal plenty of examples of Kamani executing a perfect box out to prevent the offensive board without getting the defensive rebound himself. This was literally the first shot I looked at:

That’s Auburn’s 6’11 offensive rebounding machine Dylan Cardwell that Kamani is boxing out there, allowing Black to clear the board. Cardwell’s man – Makhel Mitchell – got switched and was out on the perimeter trying to contest the shot when it went up, so if Kamani isn’t there for the box out, that’s probably an offensive rebound for the Tigers.

The NBA has a player role usually known as a “space eater”. This is a guy who is either very large or very physical under the basket, allowing him to remove opposing rebounders without getting many boards himself. The Bucks’ Brook Lopez is a prototypical example (article is from an NBA.com recap of a playoff game):

He (Lopez) had just one rebound but by eating so much space under the basket, Antetokounmpo, Middleton and PJ Tucker combined to grab 23.

Kamani isn’t exactly a space-eater like Lopez, but this is what we mean when we say that not all of a player’s contributions show up in the box score, and if that’s all you rely on, you’re going to badly misjudge what’s happening on the court.

This isn’t gymnastics

If you only take away one thing from this introduction, then take this away: the goal is not to pass the eye test. The goal is not to fill up the box score. The goal is to outscore your opponent and win the game. Obviously, passing the eye test and stuffing the stat sheet are often ways to go about winning the game. But the eye test is imperfect as it is dependent on the biases of the eyes, and the box score is (very) imperfect as it fails to capture all of a player’s contributions.

The advanced stats we use most often at Fayette Villains aim to point us to the actual goal: how does a single player (or event) help the team win? When we focus in this way, we find insights that the eye test and box score didn’t catch. We find insights that are actually predictive, rather than merely descriptive.

If something doesn’t make sense, we try and marry up everything we know: the eye test, the box score, the advanced plus-minus stats. Contrary so some claims, we don’t use numbers without an actual “knowledge of the game of basketball”. It all works together. And if someone out there with a superior knowledge of the game wants to jump in and give an alternative to Walsh at the 4 that will improve the team, I’m still waiting for it. Because nothing that Arkansas has actually tried has worked.

What lineup changes should we expect?

This section was originally going to be the main one until I felt the need to add the first section. So now this one will be much shorter.

The Mitchell conundrum

The biggest change Muss made was giving a ton of extra minutes to Makhel Mitchell, who barely played during the non-conference but has now started the Alabama and Vanderbilt games alongside Makhi, while also getting minutes against Auburn.

Here is how Arkansas has performed as a team based on which Mitchell is on the floor:

The two-Mitchell experiment is definitely a failure. Arkansas cannot afford to put both on the floor at once, as the defense suffers badly with almost no benefit to the offense.

But the difference between the Makhel-only and Makhi-only lineups is interesting, as the Makhel-only lineups are much stronger defensively in SEC play. We talked about Makhi’s defensive collapse in the Vanderbilt recap, as his DRAPM has fallen from 76 in 62 since conference play started. Makhel’s DRAPM is 71 right now, making him the better option, although the sample size for Makhel remains very small.

What are Arkansas’ options at forward?

Of course, it matters who is on the floor with them. We’re speed-running this part now, but here’s how every 5+4 lineup combo has performed in SEC play (note that Walsh might also be on the floor as the 3 in some lineups where he’s not named):

Many of these obviously suffer from a way-to-small sample size. But the two-Mitchell lineup has played half a game together so far in SEC play (about 10% of Arkansas’ total SEC possessions), so that’s probably enough to call it a failure with those numbers. Unless Arkansas significantly overhauls their offensive (and defensive) approach, I’m not sure how they can make that work.

There are some interesting combos on this list. The Makhel + Walsh combo might deserve some more looks. It was on the floor when Arkansas was pulling away from Vanderbilt late in the first half, but was inexplicably not used in the second half at all.

The last lineup is also interesting: Kamani + Walsh. It’s the second-most-used combo on this list, and through 63 possessions (almost one full game), it is outscoring opponents 71-67. To be fair, a lot of that was against Mizzou, which was the lone win. As mentioned above, Kamani can only the 5 in certain matchups, and that’s one of them.

Meanwhile, here’s all the lineups with Walsh in the game, based on who he shares the floor with. His seven possessions at the 5 came against Mizzou.

He’s played the 3 for 45 possessions, but they haven’t gone well. He was a part of 17 of the 35 two-Mitchell possessions. Outside of a 4-0 run when he shared the floor with Graham and Kamani, he’s negative in every lineup where he plays the 3.

And that makes perfect sense. As we’ve discussed, Walsh makes Arkansas better by spacing the floor as a 4. If you move him to the 3 and put two bigs in there with him, the advantage completely goes away.

Imagine this play, except that instead of Devo in the bottom corner, the Hogs also had Makhi under the basket. Does this pick-and-roll work?

Of course not! Makhi’s defender would step in the way and stop it. Walsh dragging that defender out to the perimeter is what created the open scoring lane.

Eric Musselman said during last year’s run that his solution to Arkansas’ early-season struggles was to put in the biggest lineup he had and try to out-physical the opponent. I suspect that’s why he’s started Makhel at center for the last two games. Unfortunately, lightning isn’t going to strike twice on this one. A super-jumbo lineup with Walsh at the 3 is definitely not the answer. Arkansas is going to have be better at executing a perimeter offense with Walsh at the 4.

Is there a role for Pinion?

The forward position is where most of the interesting talk has been, and it’s where we’ve seen lineup tinkering. But what about Joseph Pinion? He lit Mizzou up for 13 points but has barely played otherwise. Obviously, if Mizzou goes zone again, I think Pinion will see the floor again. But with the Hogs desperate for 3-point shooting, should he be playing more, and if so, in place of whom?

Against Mizzou, the Hogs were +10 with Pinion filling in for Ricky Council. In fact, Pinion replacing Council has produced Pinion’s best minutes. Here’s a look at the Hogs in SEC play with Pinion in or out, and then paired with various teammates:

In 80 of Pinion’s 100 possessions in SEC play, he’s shared the floor with Council. Those… haven’t gone well. Arkansas is being outscored 90-72 on those. In the 20 possessions where Pinion replaced Council in the lineup, the Hogs are up 28-22. Most of that was against Mizzou.

Council isn’t a great perimeter passer, and Pinion isn’t a shot creator, so the two have to be setting each other up. I haven’t seen that from Council at all this year.

So what’s the verdict on Pinion? I think you can give him looks in place of Council if Council is struggling, but otherwise, I don’t think he’s helping the team much. He’s only played 100 possessions in SEC play (and only 20 without Council), so it’s a bit too early to declare that he should replace Council against the zone, but I’d like to see it more.

Meet the Tigers

This part will be much shorter, because we’ve already met Mizzou this year. Since we last met, the Tigers have struggled just about as much as the Hogs:

The Tigers had to scramble to escape Vanderbilt at home, and then got thumped in their two road games. Right now, they are in a funk on both sides of the ball:

Their defense bounced back somewhat against Florida, but their offense has faded over their last two games and the defense hasn’t had a truly strong performance since before Thanksgiving.

Model pick: Mizzou 81, Arkansas 79. The Hogs are finally picked to lose a game, so maybe rock bottom has already passed.

Scouting Report

The Tigers aren’t doing anything differently from last time. They’ll go extremely fast and space the floor with 5-out looks, aiming to either get to the rim or launch a 3-pointer. They shoot well with confidence. Their main weakness is a lack of size: they don’t snag offensive boards or draw fouls particularly well.

Defensively, expect zone. They’ve been awful in all looks this season, but zone lets him compete, though they’ll likely get destroyed on offensive glass. They allow a lot of open 3-point looks. Their aggressiveness means they do force turnovers but they will also foul a lot.

Starters

Mizzou

  • Nick Honor, PG, 5’10 (+2.9 BPM, 90 RAPM, 100 ORAPM, 15 DRAPM)
  • Sean East II, PG, 6’3 (+0.5 BPM, 56 RAPM, 84 ORAPM, 21 DRAPM)
  • D’Moi Hodge, SG, 6’4 (+11.5 BPM, 88 RAPM, 99 ORAPM, 24 DRAPM)
  • Noah Carter, PF, 6’6 (+3.2 BPM, 91 RAPM, 83 ORAPM, 87 DRAPM)
  • Kobe Brown, PF, 6’8 (+8.3 BPM, 99 RAPM, 100 ORAPM, 67 DRAPM)

Arkansas

  • Anthony Black, PG, 6’7 (+3.9 BPM, 100 RAPM, 98 ORAPM, 98 DRAPM)
  • Ricky Council IV, CG, 6’6 (+5.2 BPM, 98 RAPM, 93 ORAPM, 97 DRAPM)
  • Devo Davis, SG, 6’4 (+0.3 BPM, 95 RAPM, 79 ORAPM, 96 DRAPM)
  • Jordan Walsh, SF, 6’7 (+2.3 BPM, 99 RAPM, 100 ORAPM, 88 DRAPM)
  • Kamani Johnson, PF, 6’7 (+2.2 BPM, 93 RAPM, 91 ORAPM, 83 DRAPM)

I’m basing Arkansas’ lineup off what we would like to see, as this lineup features the Hogs’ clear five best players for the season. As a bonus, the Hogs don’t need any more size than this, as Mizzou is still smaller.

For Mizzou, the two guys to watch are obviously Brown and Hodge. Brown has added some outside shooting to his game, but he’s mostly a threat under the basket, where he shoots a high percentage and doesn’t turn it over. He’ll take you off the dribble, but he’s not elite at that. Mizzou will set him up for post entry passes as well.

Hodge has to be defended off the ball. He’s a dangerous 3-point shooter, but he’s not elite at creating his own shot. Devo shut him down nicely in the last game, and a repeat performance is needed.

Honor is low-usage, but he dishes out assists, doesn’t turn it over much, shoots a good percentage, and draws fouls. He basically does everything well on offense, just in small doses. East is similar as a distributor, but he’s a bit more turnover-prone and not as good at drawing fouls.

Bench

Mizzou

  • Tre Gomillion, SG, 6’4 (+0.4 BPM, 79 RAPM, 98 ORAPM, 17 DRAPM)
  • DeAndre Gholston, SG, 6’5 (-0.1, 55 RAPM, 26 ORAPM, 82 DRAPM)
  • Aiden Shaw, PF, 6’8 (-3.1 BPM, 37 RAPM, 85 ORAPM, 5 DRAPM)

Mizzou’s bench represents a pretty significant downgrade. Gomillion is low-usage, but shoots a decent percentage and crashes the offensive boards. Gholston is a defensive specialist, but he shoots way too often on offense for a guy that isn’t hitting at a great percentage. Shaw is a 4-star freshman who can score from all levels but is a ghastly defender right now.

Arkansas

  • Makhi Mitchell, PF, 6’9 (+8.1 BPM, 74 RAPM, 75 ORAPM, 62 DRAPM)
  • Makhel Mitchell, C, 6’10 (+8.8 BPM, 65 RAPM, 46 ORAPM, 71 DRAPM)
  • Jalen Graham, PF, 6’9 (+5.2 BPM, 43 RAPM, 25 ORAPM, 67 DRAPM)

If Arkansas starts its best five players, the bench isn’t deep either. Makhi gives some offensive help, while Makhel is the best defender off the bench… but there’s a huge dropoff going to any of these guys.

When Mizzou has the ball

Mizzou’s offense hasn’t really declined since the first meeting, as they are still a devastating transition team. The Hogs have suddenly had some (possibly effort-related) issues in transition, causing their transition defense to sink a little bit. If they aren’t dialed in, that’s one way Mizzou could make this a long night.

Mizzou is going to take good shots and hit them at a good rate. If Arkansas can get its 3-point defense back on track – there’s a luck element to 3-point defense, and Vanderbilt busted right through it – then the Hogs can win by forcing a few turnovers and dominating the defensive glass. Mizzou not being great at drawing fouls is a good thing for Arkansas… though Vanderbilt wasn’t either and they drew 30 fouls on Saturday.

When Arkansas has the ball

Arkansas has never quite managed to get its transition offense on solid ground. The Hogs can still convert turnovers into fast break points, but running in general has been a challenge. That makes everything more difficult.

The challenge with this matchup is that Mizzou is most vulnerable from beyond the arc, but Arkansas is not well-equipped to hit them there.

Instead, Arkansas needs to finish the shots at the rim they get (Mizzou is 313th in rim defense) and crash the offensive boards (Mizzou is 338th in defensive rebounding). Using four-guard looks to try and space the Mizzou out as much as possible is the starting point. You might see Pinion play a bit like he did last time. It’s worth noting that of his 3 made 3-pointers, none of them came against the set-up zone. His first two were in transition (while Mizzou was trying to set up their zone) and the third came after Mizzou had left the zone for man-to-man. Arkansas mostly beat the zone with offensive rebounding and transition, and that’s really their best option once again.

Keys to the Game

  1. Dominate the boards. Rebounding at both ends will be critical. Mizzou will hit some shots, but Arkansas can create more opportunities by rebounding well.
  2. Pace and space. The Hogs really need to get back to playing Hog ball. Spread the Tigers out and get those guards into (relatively) open lanes. The zone makes that hard, but good pace leads to shots before the zone is set up, and good spacing leads to offensive boards.


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